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Resources and Environmental Policy 
Jan Narveson 
Summary: 
This paper is a partly empirical and partly conceptual inquiry into the notion of 
Resources. Current "Environmentalists" evidently think of resources as natural. identi­
fying them with quantities of stuff - oil, say, or land. And they suppo.se that such 
resources must be finite in amount and therefore scarce, so that when we use any of these 
we leave less left - less for others. llUs way of thinking is, I argue, entirery wrong. 
Resources for people are not finite; they expand with human thought and effort , without 
upper limit. There are no global shonages of anything that we have to worry about, 
nothing requiring the imposition of extra-market controls on our use of the stuff of the 
world. All environmental policies based on such premises are consequently ill-con­
ceived, and bound to work only harm. 
Introduction 
No one needs to have it proven that the big news these days is The Environment. People 
are persuaded that we are "endangering the planet"; walls are decorated with "I Love the 
Earth" or "Every Day is Earth Day", and so forth. Canada has put out a "Green Paper", 
detailing lots of expensive legislation allegedly designed to "protect the environment". 
Sryrofoam cups are· the object of derision (and, of course, restrictive legislation); DDT 
has long since been stricken from che list of available resources; a pound of pcb is worth 
half a million dollars of politically1engendered expenditure. And we have been told for 
decades that the earth is finite, that resources are limited, scarce, that there is danger of 
a "population explosion", about which we must "do something"; and so on. 
We cannot take on all of this at once here, but I shall devote attention in this paper 
to one very major-indeed, in obvious ways, the major-assumptlion underlying all this, 
namely, the claim that natural resources are scarce, fixed, finite, limited. From this 
premise all sorts of interesting and important conclusions are drawn. The mo.st impor­
tant, perhaps, from the general human point of view is the inference that population 
"problems" threaten us, and thus that we need to restrict population growth. This 
translates especially, in current circumstances, into policies that could easily look, to the 
impartial observer, pretty racist: for the "we" who need to do the restricting, and the 
"populations" that allegedly need restricting tum out to be quite different in racial 
respects: of course it is we enlightened middle,class white folks in the rich countries who 
need to do something to impose restrictions on the supposedly burgeoning populations 
of the unenlightened brown, black, or yellow folks. 
By way of counterbalance to this racist,Iooking tendency, there is ample room for 
upper-middle,class hair-shirtism as well - in the end, we are impartially hard on 
everybody, on balance. For it is often claimed that there is a horrendous "imbalance" 
between, say, the North and the South. Thus I have heard it said that Canada, the per 
capita most energy-use-intensive country in the world, uses something like 40 times the 
energy per capita that India does. Those who point this out seem to think that something 
important follows from this- not that the Indians could maybe use a bit more, but rather 
that we need co use quite a lot less. And why? Because energy is "finite", limited, and so 
more for us is less for them, which is thought to be unfair. 2
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I shall not discuss here the subject of whether lt would be unfair even if it were true· 
since my main interest in this is to persuade you that it is not true, that people's reasons 
for chinling it is true rest partly on ignorance of fact, buc far more on conceptu� 
confusion, propelled by politically#engendered boondoggling. 2 Admittedly the realm a 
facts used to be thought to lie beyond the province of us Olympian philosophers - w, 
were not to sully our hands with such things. While there is still .some reason co thinl 
something of the son, we should draw the line at levels of ignorance that leave us ouc of 
touch with reality, which is the situation today in regard to matters envilronmental. 
Besides, typically philosophers have taken this plunge. It's too late to retreat to pristin, 
a priorism. 
But the main burden of this paper, which is addressed not just co philosophers3 but to 
all those who are currently involved with these issues, is the conceptual point about the 
nature of resources. 
One cautionary note. My paper, as befits a philosopher, concerns the global situation, 
the situation for humankind at large and the whole planet on which we live. Scarcities 
for particular people and groups of people are, of course, a fact oflife and always, indeed 
necessarily, will be. Pan of the object here, indeed, will be to define, or rather, since ic's 
so simple a matter to do so, to remind us of the meaning of the notion of scarcity. But today 
we are told on all fronts that it is indeed rhe world that faces scarcities. le is that claim that 
I wish to lay fumJ!y to rest. In the senses in which these claims are put forward, they are 
all false. 
This is very good news for us humans, though for some reason it seems to fall very 
unwelcomely on intellectuals' ears these days. That is one of the reasons I am discussing 
this. The other is that it is extremely important for policy at all levels: personal, local, 
provincial or state, national, and global. Wrong assumptions about this matter make a 
drastic difference to our lives, and on a reasonably liberal and humane normative 
perspective, the differences made by errors on the matter are all very much for the worse. 
Natural Resource Scarcity: The Argument 
In general reaction to most of the global environmentalist fearmongers, I shall propose 
in this essay a general theorem about resources. To explore this, let us look at what would 
have co be shown by the pessimists. Their standard form of argument must go something 
like this: 
1. There are particular kinds of natural resource, X, such that 
people require some amount of X in order to live [or - a criticaUy 
important variant - to live at such;and#:such a "level"); 
2. Resource X is finite; 
3. Therefore, Resource X is scarce; 
4. Therefore, "we" must do something - before it's too late. 
The conclusion, (4) , is invariably of the form that collective, politically imposed control 
over the relevant population [the world's, ours, or whichever is in question] , and/or that 
population's consumption of X - is called for, and soon, before people start dying in 
droves (or their "quality of life" declines below the threshold implicitly or explicitly 3
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lefined by the theorise in question). 
The argument in form seems plausible, and has proved remarkably seductive. I am 
nyself among those formerly seduced: in my own earlier work on population questionsi, 
ibscract though it was, I assumed that some such argument must be sound: that there are 
u lease some values of X, relevant to the argument, for which some such conclusion 
holds. But ie is wrong. l e  is wrong in face, and, more irnponantly for high-level policy 
purposes, it is wrong in principle. Specifically, I shall argue: 
I .  Its opening premise, for all inceresting and relevant values ofX, 
is simply false. 
2. The reasoning from premise (2) to premise (3) is fallacious: 
scarciry just does not follow from finitude. Even for many irnponant 
specific types of what are currently considered resources, indeed, 
finitude is perfectly compatible with the resource being empirically 
unlimited, in relation to art) feasible level of demand, extending 
indefinitely into the future. 
3. It is wildly off in its third premise, that resources are {globally) 
scarce in any sense that would suppon the conclusion; it is empirically 
refuted at every tum of the clock, for reasons of a very general and 
fundamental type, of interest to social theorists. 
4. The fourth claim wouldn' t strictly follow even if the first three 
were true; under the circumstances, of course, it is essentially irrel­
evant. 
• 
Conclusion: insofar as the conclusion of this argument is thought to follow from the 
types of premises considered, it should be rejected. There are other and darker reasons 
why people would want to limit other people's family sizes, consumption of various things 
people enjoy, and so on, but they are not the immediate concern of this essay. Let us now 
proceed to detailed analysis. 
1. First Premise: On being "necessary'' 
The opening premise is crucial: that there are at least some resolJlrces to which. the rest 
of the argument applies, some specific kinds of things which are essential to life, or at least 
to a "decent" life or a good one. And it does seem plausible at first glance. Don't we 
require food and water, say, and surely living space? Of course, we do. But none of these 
is necessary for life, or for life at any panicular "level", in any sense in which it is either 
inherently or in any re�ant sense, " scarce" or even finite, in practical terms. Air, for 
instance, is actually a source of oxygen, which in a pinch can be supplied independently 
of"air" -witness astronauts and deepsea divers, etc. Water is perhaps irreplaceable but, 
as we will see below, not even in fantasy "scarce" on a global level. Food is, of course, 
necessary: however nature does not contain any "food"7• All it contains are things like 
apples, mollusks, yaks, and a very few, very primitive (and no longer much used) varieties 
of cenain grains. No one of these is "necessary for life". Indeed, if nutritional needs is what 
we are· talking about, then probably all of them, even now, could be met by wholly 
synthetic substances, just as probably all of them now are met, for most people we know, 
4
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by specific substances which never existed prior to a century ago - e.g., specific varieties 
of grairu that never grew in the wilds but were created by geneticists and agricultural 
biologists. 
The point here is that as regards specific subsumces - the only things that there are 
- few if any of them can plausibly be regarded as essential to life, either "quantitatively" 
or at any "quality" level you might wish to specify. Of course there are nonnative issues 
kicking around here. You can always find some enthusiast who insists that you "haven't 
lived" until you 've tried X, where X ranges over Wheaties, pate de fois gras, Single-malt 
Scotch, the string quintets of Mozan, and no end of other items. Need I say more? 
Minima and Decency 
The first premise is made co look more plausible by insisting, not on the minimum level 
of X needed to keep a human life going at all, but on the minimum needed for a "  decent" 
or "acceptable" level. Of course as soon as you get into this, you are into highly debatable 
and subjective matters. American welfare cases have income levels that would be the 
envy of any but upper,class Pakistanis. Yet lower class Pakistanis exist, have lived for 
thousands of years. Noc too many theorists in the West are quite arrogant enough co say 
that we should go and exterminate all those below,the,minimum low,Iifers, but a 
surprising number of them seem to think that it is nevertheless our moral duty to prevent 
them from coming into existence in the fuse place. Why?, one might ask. (We'll return 
to that point lacer.) 
Meanwhile, I will shortly go farther out on my limb and propose that there is no 
minimum level high enough to make the argument go through. 
Subsdtution 
One main general point in respect to premise ( 1 ) is that for any actual specific 
substance you can name, call it X -we can do without X just fine, by utilizing something 
else, Y, instead. And the availability of Y depends, for all practical purposes, entirely on 
technology (which, of course, also requires human energy) and scarcely at all on the 
existence of definite quantities of particular natural substances. With the very doubtful 
exceptions of water, air, and space, there are no other instances in which premise ( I )  
holds true at the global level. And in the case of water, air, and space, substitution 
(depending on what you count as a "substitute") is unnecessary, as will be detailed below, 
since they are in no relevant sense "finite" anyway. 
Finitude 
Plato loved mathematics, and philosophers have always been greatly impressed by 
mathematical notions, among them the notion of the 'infinite' and hence the 'finite'. But 
when we are arguing about resources, the fact that the number of cubic meters of this or 
that is not infinite, which is near enough to being a necessary truth anyway, is obviously 
not relevant. A resource is relative to a use. The word 'resource' is incomplete: to be a 
resource is to be useful/or some purpose. When it is said that "resources are finite", it is 
of no relevance to point out that the available quantity of a given substance that currently 
supplies the demand in question is measured by what mathematicians call one of the 
"natural" numbers. What matters is whether it is realistically conceivable that we might run 
out of the stuff some day. If a resource is adequate to any realistically possible need, then 
5
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ic is not relevanil)· "fin ice". 'Finite· should, in these concexts, imply 'pocentiaUy scarce·. 
on some reasonable criterion of scarcity (as will be discussed in the next point) : chat some 
scuff is in the out-and-our mathematical sense finice is of no interest for present purposes. 
No argument whose premise is merely that something or other is "finite" is, as ir stands, 
capable of supporting any of the interesting conclusions we are looking at here. 
from Finitude to Scarcity? 
We drink water in at one end - but then, out it comes at the other (and through our 
pores and in our breath). Clean it up, and it's all ready co be used again. And again, and 
again. (The astronauts are a particularly high-tech instance.) The amount of water in the 
world is, of course, "'finite" (though immense). But in global terms. it is in no interesting 
way .. scarce". It can be very scarce at cenain points in the Sahara if you are an ill-prepared 
c:raveller, co be sure, and the cost of supplying clean water for populations with fabulously 
high standards of cleanliness in such matters, such as ourselves, may sometimes go up for 
awhile. But globally ? Ic's just not going to happen. 
The same is true of food and air (more details below). In goes c:he food at one end, and 
out the ocher comes fertilizer and materials for replenishing the earth. The earth's 
"biomass'', as the current jargon has it, does not decrease. Astronauts live in a closed­
cycle environment: 100% of what they cake in is converted into reusable food, water, and 
air. For us terrestrials, resources are, at the global level, infinite in relarion r.o any conceivable 
demand. Finitude does not entail scarcity. 
The same analysis, more surprisingly, applies to those more specific, less .. essential" 
resources of which we are so fond: iron, oil, copper, gold, you name it. To a considerable 
extent, of course, these too are reusable and recyclable. More important, as has already 
been noted, is that they are indefinitely substitutable. Who can straight facedly claim to 
know what people's houses, means of transportation, and so on will be mostly made of 100 
years hence? Perhaps interesting to the philosophically inclined is that, given enormous 
amounts of energy, we could probably literally make all of these substances if we really 
wanced to: new and far more sensible versions of alchemy have turned out to be distinctly 
possible, as has the production of new planes and animals by selective breeding and by 
genetic splicing. But for the foreseeable term, it is unnecessary, because in fact we are not 
anywhere near co running out of anything, even with present technologies. Nor will we 
be. Ever. 
With regard to these other sorts of resource, there is a further basic reason why 'fmite' 
doesn't entail 'scarce': it is that we learn to use these substances more efficiently. We get 
more miles per gallon, more bridge per ton of steel, and so on. If the rate at which we dig 
into the earth's resources declines even as we make more and more things with those 
resources, then of course the picture of a supply that is dwindling remorselessly already 
begins to lose its ominous quality. Technology, in other words, is again the essential 
catalyst. And technology is, of course, driven by the market. {It is also, as we will be 
emphasizing further below, in principle literally unlimited.) The very fact that a specific 
resource is getting harder to come by spurs research. on how to use them better or avoid 
them and use something else. And the research is always successful-a face which should 
be quite unsurprising. 
3. Scarcity 
Some basic resources are not in any sense even fmite, not even potentially scarce. 6
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What about the rest. though! Aren'c we running low on some resources, such as oil, 
copper, iron? And what about food? Isn't there starvation? lsn't there reason for concern? 
The short answers to these questions are, again, negative. We are not "running low" on 
anything, and there is no reason to thinlc that we will, either sooner or Im.er. And the kind 
of concern we need to have abouc starvation has nothing to do with global scarcity -
at least not of food. Brains, decency, JX>litical savvy, yes -but not food itself or the means 
to produce it. 
Here are a few bToad empirical JX>ints regarding some major cases, co buttress the 
analysis. 
Food 
People just love to prophesy that we are running short of fcxxl, even as the surpluses 
mount skyward in those countries foolish enough to subsidize its production; indeed, 
those same countries often resort to paying their farmers not to grow crops on their 
agricultural land . (Yet the Government of Ontario is so shortsighted as to impose severe 
restrictions on the conversion of "prime agricultural land", which Canada with its trivial 
population needs like another hole in the head, to residential area, which it can really 
use, or commercial, manufacturing. SJX>rts, and other uses. It's billed as "far�sighted", of 
course. But as the number of acres needed to grow a given amount of food declines year 
after year, and the amount grown continues to mount anyway, this is an odd sort of 
"farsightedness" - it consists in staring fixedly backwards on the technological front, 
and of course averting your gaze from the expressed interests of mere people.) 
Food is, of course, locally scarce in countries foolish enough to keep food prices 
artificially low, and heartless enough to block entry to the mountains of provisions so 
readily extended by generous wealthy nations. Coercive restriction of agricultural prices, 
as in Nicaragua and various African countries, provides highly efficient disincentives to 
their farmers, and outright starvation can indeed result, especially if you then turn loose 
plenty of well-armed troops to drive people from the land they know how to farm to land 
they don't. But that is no reflection on the capacity of either the land or the farmers in 
those countries to produce food. And the cure for it is by now utterly obvious: don't do 
it. Let farmers and consumers agree on their prices, i.e. let the food production and 
distribution system be market,driven, and those farmers will cheerfully supply the 
demand. 
AU of the actual starvation in the world, since the first half of this century, has been 
due to politics, and some of it to poor management and technology as well. None of it 
can be ascribed to globally limited resources (and almost none even to locally limited 
resources). And this too is unsurprising, again for essentially the same reason. Basically, 
as I say, the food that goes into us at one end and comes out in different forms at the other 
converts, by assorted familiar processes, back into food. It is an inherently recycled class 
of products. Malthus was wrong in principle. 
Land 
People talk of a finite and supposedly dwindling supply of agricultural land, or of 
fertilizer, and the like, and infer that doom awaits the unwary. Part of the problem with 
such arguments is conceptual, and we will take that up a little later. But for the moment 
consider that on recent estimates, enough food can be grown to supply the minimal 
nutritional needs of an average human on a mere 27 square meters of earth - about the 
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size of the average living room for a "bourgeois" homeowner. If my mathematics isn'c coo 
far off, then at this best<urrencly,po.ssible output, that's enough to feed 37.000 people 
with the output from one square kilometer (or dose to l 00,CXX) per square mile) 5• Ac that 
rate, the entire current population of the world could be fed on an area the size of, say, 
New Brunswick - one of Canada's smallest Provinces. If we suppo.se that even 1 /4 of 
that efficiency is pretty realistically possible on good farmland, then to feed everyone in 
the world nowadays would require an area roughly the size of the State of Kansas. With 
hydroponic farming technology, now beginning to come on stream, food output per unic 
could beat that by a wide margin. And there is no limU w this process. You have to keep your 
head very firmly fixed in the technological sand to mouth Malthusian slogans about food 
production in the face of what we now know- not to mention what we will lcnow in the 
future. 
Obviously much agriculture is currently far less efficient than that. But the doomsayers 
need to be talking about necessary limits - about resources being inherentry so limited as 
to pose serious obstacles to sustained development, even at (mere) current rates. They 
should be told that both their figures and their reasoning are wildly off base. The intrinsic 
capabilities of known resources even with current technologies are so far beyond 
requirements that talk of scarcity of resources in this connection is, to put it bluntly, in 
cloud,cuckooland - as the facts keep on confirming. Agricultural production goes up 
and up, at a pace in advance of population; so does industrial production of all sorts (and 
would far more still, if the human resources siphoned off into the administration of 
programs designed to repress it were instead utilized for its further enhancement). 
Here's a lovely example of what people who are bound and determined to find a crisis 
around every comer will say about this matter. Anne Ehrlich tells us that "between 1950 
and 2000, acreage of land planted in grains per person worldwide will have shrunk by 
half. Nearly all the 2.6,fold increase in grain production since 1950 has come from 
increasing yields (production per acre). "6But supposing that she wasn,t wrong about that 
situation (as she is), just what is supposed to be wrong with that? She doesn't say -
despite the obvious inference from what she does say. For the population of the world 
has not increased by anything like 2.6x since 1950 {it's more like 1.4), so that ·in fact the 
amount of food available, on a per capita basis, has greatly increased. So even if her "facts" 
about the absolute amount of farmland available were correct, what her claims would 
imply is that acres of farmland available is becoming· increasingly iTTeletlam, since humans 
can take care of their needs for food admirably on a decreasing amount ofland. Her facts 
are wildly off anyway - acreage under cultivation has increased steadily over the past 
century and is still doing so7; but even if they weren't, why would it matter, so long as we 
can extract more from a given acre, and our capacity to make an acre yield more can 
reasonably be expected to continue? After, there is no reason why the food supply per 
pmon should keep expanding: individual people are nor expanding ar exponential rates, 
after all - why should their food supply? ( If anything, Americans and Canadians are 
struggling to keep their food intake down !) Alas, Ehrlich's report is no worse than most. 
Living space 
If we think in terms of units of space on the surface of the earth, then let us concede 
abstractly that this is in principle "finite". But again, no conclusions follow. For one thing, 
most living space nowadays is not on the ground. And there is no literally obvious limit 
to the height to which buildings can be built, thus accommodating many more people 
on the same area of the earth's surface . When a one,hundred story aparonent building 8
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comfortably housing 40,CXX) people could be built on one acre ofland, che meaning of the 
claim that living#space is Limited becomes exceedingly unclear. Recall that the tenn 
'finite' in the-se contexts muse be interpreted in a relevant manner: if a resource is 
adequate to any realistically conceivable need, then it is not relevancly "finite". 
As regards .. lebensraum" for people, scarcicy in any case is striccly academic. Julian 
Simon points out chat one million people were said co have gathered at once in 
Tianamnan Square in Beijing. Ac that densicy, every last one of the one billion Chinese 
could stand in an area smaller than the ciry of Beijing alone - and ic occupies a miniscule 
percentage of the whole area of China. For that mace er. the enriTe population of che world 
could stand in che area occupied by my own modest conurbation in Ontario (ca. 300,000 
occupants at present). Of course we don't want to be standing elbow co elbow on the 
earth. But there is no humanly conceivable scenario in which people would multiply to 
that extent, making the point utterly academic. 
One of the most densely populated countries on earth is Holland. If the whole 
inhabitable part of the earth were populated as densely as it, there would be more than 
fifry bi1lion.s of us - a figure which there are excellent and familiar reasons to think will in 
fact never be reached in any case: in all of the .. advanced" countries, natural population 
change from live births is negative and has been for years. Yet in Holland there are lots 
of open spaces, forests, meadows, fields full of flowers, plenty of purely ornamental (non 
space#efficient) buildings, walks, and so on. Tallc of a world population that is "burgeon­
ing out of control", with catastrophe around the next comer or so, is simply out of line 
with reality. The fact, in short, is that the present population of the world could increase 
tenfold and it would still not be "overcrowded" in any interesting sense of the word. Since 
there is little reason to think that it will do anything of the sort anyway, there is no "space 
issue" i it is a non-issue. The case for imposing artificial restrictions on population growth 
from limited global resources of either food or space is, in short, nonexistent. 
Other Resources 
When people thinlc that things are scarce and must get scarcer, their argument is 
probably about a scarcity of something else which they suppose is essential to the 
production of food: not only land, which we have just discussed, but fertilizer, say, or 
water, or the energy necessary to desalinate or otherwise clean up the water, or something 
else. It is for this reason that I address the argument in terms of "all interesting values of 
X". What makes a value of X interesting for this purpose is that it is at least in principle 
plausible to regard it as finite in a sense sufficiently robust to get the rest of the argument 
off the ground. Iron, for instance, or oil, or whatever, are sometimes claimed to be in such 
a state of insitu supply that the world must expect serious shortages in the foreseeable 
future. We can then formulate my "theorem" concerning resources: namely, chat in 
regard to all such resources, the premise of this argument concerning "scarcity" is always 
false. There are no relevant global scarcities for this purpose. Arguments based on the 
contrary are utterly unsound. 
Energy 
When any particular resource begins to run shon or become more difficult to get, 
substitution of some other resource usually requires an input of energy, and in any case 
we do - thus far!8 - need energy for heat and the like. And pundits have been quite 
hyperactive about predicting energy scarcities looming before us, unless we adopt a more 
9
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primitive lifestyle9 quite soon. It is useful to apprecrate that they are ennrely wrong in all 
such predictions, and that there is from the ix:>int of view of resource availability no 
reason for concern. There's only the same old familiar reason that each of us always has, 
and always will have, to economize on our use of :resources so that we can have more 
money to spend on something else. But energy is an especially useful example to illustrate 
the need to be clear about whac scarcity is. We tum to that first, and then present some 
points about energy sources and resources. 
Assessing Scarcity: Two Conceptual Approaches 
Scarcicy is a relative notion, for one thing: a thing is scarce in relation to need or irueresc 
_ to what economists call demand. And it is also, of course, quantitatively variable. 
Things aren't just "scarce" or .. plentiful", but rather, they are more or less scarce. But 
what measures that? 
Here I am indebted (even more than elsewhere) ro Julian Simon's revelatory 
discussion of these mane rs. Simon distinguishes two ways of umeasuring" resources: the 
"cechnological", and the "economic". (UR10, 15�4 l )  
(1)  The technol.ogical method consists in rrying c o  come up with a figure purporting to 
represent the quantity of a certain kind of stuff left in the earth as a whole, suc.h as cmde 
oil. 
(2) The economic method, on the other hand, consists, much more simply, in noting 
price trends for the resource on the market. (To do this, of course, you have to have a 
market; if "prices" are strictly artefacts of the prevailing government's ideology, then 
they may imply nothing much abouc real supply. Lu:ckily, all major commodities are now 
on world markets, so that no matter what some benighted country may do, it can't keep 
prices from telling their story.) 
When headline-writers, politicians, and environmentally-inclined philosophers talk 
of scarcity, they in variably produce forecasts of the first, or technological sore. There tum 
out to be excellent reasons why this procedure is certain to do little but obfuscate the 
issues. For purposes of global resource estimation - the primary purpose for which 
doomsday-scenario writers use them - such repons are essentially useless. Here's why. 
First: no technologist, no expert, knows now or will in the foreseeable future know 
what is supposed to be at stake here, namely, the absolute amount of oil, iron, gold, and 
so forth left in the earth as a whole. Simon gives just one small but extremely pregnant 
example of the problem here: In assessing copper resources, do we count the copper salts 
dissolved in the sea? (UR, 3 1  ) We can add to that from familiar cases. Is oil from shale 
and the Athabaska tar sands to be included in the amount of oil left? What about alcohol 
that ,can be made from grains, or gasoline from coal? Grain is an open-ended resource -
we can grow an indefinitely large amount. Given what has already been said about food 
production, this means straight off that there is no practical upper bound to the amount 
ofliquid fuel the world could avail itself of. Coal? That is already !known by technological 
methods to be so plentiful that the earth's supply would last millenia even at cu rrent rates 
of consumption, even without the more efficient utilization thac is no doubt possible and 
is improving daily. 
The mention of efficient utilization brings up another subject of crucial importance 10
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here: namely, the method of extTaction - mining, say. To illustrate the point here, let's look 
ac attempts at technological estimates of the amount of liquid oil "left". Well, left how? 
That is, remaining to be extracted U, which means? Even estimates of what i.s retrievable 
by current normal technologies vary enormously from one interested party co the next 
- depending, it seems, on what they are trying co prove. To take a typical but striking 
example, mentioned by Simon: the U.S. Geological Survey used a definition of recover­
able crude oil that includes anlJ what can be brought to surface at aa:nospheric pressure 
[UR 106). But a writer for The Wall SCTeet Journal Ooseph Barnea) pointed out that if 
instead we count what can be forced co the surface ac higher pressures, the figure would 
rise by a factor of 100! [UR. 369) So which of those two estimates would we use? Since 
the technology for extracting at higher pressures already exists, it comes down to whether 
you want it enough to pay more for your extraction equipment. Of course, the prices of 
all manufactured products decline sceadily with increasing use, so that ere long che price 
of oil by these new methods will be even lower in real terms than it was before. 
Irresponsible people nor long ago waved figures in the decades regarding the cime left 
before the "supply" of oil we have left is exhausted. Even as regards holes already drilled, 
those are known to have been ridiculously pessimistic. (The U.S. Geological Survey, after 
see ing "little or no chance for oil in California", prophesied the same for Kansas and Tex as 
in 1891. 11) But nobody knows how many more holes one could drill, or how much deeper 
we could go for more of same, and so on. 
Mose imponandy, as will be emphasized below, everything depends on the growth of 
technology. But that cannot in principle be predicted in a relevant sense, other than to 
note that all trends are extremely "up". Thus, "technological" estimates and forecasts 
should be regarded with extreme distrust. Until we know precisely which technology is 
being assumed, precisely what limitations on the relevant locations being considered, 
what "grade" of natural substance we are talking about, and so on, anything said will be 
too misleading to be of any use. Most importantly of all, the one assumption we need to 
make to come up with arry estimates of this type is known to be always false: namely, chat 
nothing will happen in the future co change the situation. Bue it is in principle impossible 
to predict that technology will cease to develop, and of all the things that have been 
consistently expanding in the past, it tops the list by a very large margin. 
Energy is among the most substitutable of resources, of course, and it is especially this 
that grounds complete confidence in the unlimited nature of chis resource. Will the easy 
oil run out, a dozen centuries or so down the pike? Even if it will, there's electricity, which 
can be generated from various sources - water, uranium, coal, and so forth.. Eventually, 
we may safely conjecture, there will be a way to obtain energy from hydrogen fusion as 
a source for electricity, and when that happens, nobody will be able to talk meaningfully 
of scarcity. However difficult it has proven so far, it would be rash to predict that human 
ingenuity will never effectively harness this unlimited resource. 
Bear in mind, by way of concluding this section, that whatever the precise truth may 
tum out to be regarding anything in this area at any given time in the future, it will be 
to the effect that we have even more than we thought. What we know at any given time 
is that Telative to current methods, we have such,and#such an amount. What we don't 
know, because we can't, is how much more there absolutely is. And what we have every 
reason to believe is that it will in general be vasrfy more than anybody thought. (For one 
small example: The amount of copper estimated to be retrievable by current techniques, 
after twenty years of heavy and increasing use, was 179% in 1970 compared co 1950. ) 
The other way of forecasting is the "economist's" way, which consists simply in noting 
general price trends over reasonably long terms. Prices, of course, fluctuate locally and 
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globally for various reasons. But longer-term prices of commodities relative, say, to the 
typical income of a working�class family do give us a useful measure. If over the long term 
prices in those terms are declining, then there cannot be real scarciry; scarciry cannot 
be increasing if prices are decreasing on a free market. For the owners of resources will 
hold out for the highest price they can gee, and if quantities available decline relative to 
demand, then prices must go up. Moreover, if the prospects in the nearish future were 
for rescricced supply, people would invest in futures for such produces. 
But the fact is, that they have gone down. All of them have, over the years, as Simon 
details. 12 Noc jusc compucers, CD players, and so on, buc also coal, iron, oil, dectriciry 
- you name it, and a curve drawn over many decades shows a decline. The supply of 
resources available co satisfy our various desires has in fact been increasing, right along 
with the increase of population and the resc. Ic's been increasing for hundreds of years; 
it is still doing so; and there is every reason co argue, as Simon does, that this can continue 
indefinitely. There is, in sum, no problem of scarce natural material resources., no clear­
eyed view of the future showing only blackness and its attendant support for imposed 
rescrictions. 
Resources and Technology 
A further and more "philosophical" reflection on the nature of resources is now in 
orde r. Let us ask: What does it mean to say that resources "exist"? Are there kinds of 
material entities which just simply are, as they stand, resources? It is quickly apparent on 
modest reflection that the answers to these questions are almost entirely negative. A 
deeper look will persuade you mat they are in fact entirely negative. 
Whether something is a resource depends on two things: (1) whether there is a 
demand (a need, an interest, a positive valuation by someone) for what can be made out 
of it; and (2) whether somebody knows how to make things that satisfy that demand out 
of that stuff . The two factors are by no means independent. We don' t generally 
"demand" what is known to be unattainable, and of course, as Marx and others observed, 
we do come to demand what newly becomes attainable despite being previously 
undreamed of. We develop technologies because we have a fairly good idea what people 
do and will want. We can view technology, and therefore, of course, the people who do 
the thinking and research necessary to produce it, as itself a resource, and if we do, then 
of course it is by every rational measure the primary resource of them all - as Simon puts 
it, the "ultimate" resource. 
Moreover, we may think of another aspect of all this as either part of the same resource 
or an additional resource: namely, the moral "software" of society, which enables people 
co get ahead instead of having to devote all their resources co defending themselves from 
those who would invade and despoil them, or more recently, impede and frustrate their 
efforts. We will return to that theme later. 
Meanwhile, it is instructive to see how people think of this human factor in 
production. In 19 57 and 1962, two researchers, Robert Solow and Edward F. Denison, 
attempted to "calculate the extent to which the growth of physical capital and of the 
labor force could account for economic growth in the U.S. and Europe." As] ulian Simon 
observes, "both found that even after capital and labor are allowed for, much of the 
economic growth .. . cannot reasonably be explained by any factor other than an 
improvement in the level of technological practice." [UR, 197]1 If anyone is impressed 
by this finding, then he or she is one of the people I want to talk to. For anyone who 
regards this claim as just one more question of fact about an economy has simply not 
12
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thought very deeply on this subject. Let us see why. 
&onomic growth is growth per capua. (Any concern with "GNP" chac neglects to 
relate lt to that though it is often enough done - are absurdly nationalistic. Those who 
attach significance to such gross figures evidently conceive ic to be che point of an 
economy to promote the wealth of "the nation" ral.her than of the people in ic. This silly 
view might appeal to budding demagogues, but not to thinhng people.) 
Once we accept that, then to speak of "growth of the labor force", as such, is absurd, 
unless what is meant is that a higher proportion of che populatiOf\ is doing .. useful" work. 
For after all, 100% of a populacion is its maximum "work force", and almost all of us are 
doing something all our waking hours, something to keep body and soul together. So if 
we say such things as that the "work force" in a particular group of people has '"expanded" 
or .. contracted", then we must be chinking that work consists in employmenc for pay. By 
that reckoning, persons who live without going through the medium of money co do it 
aren't counted as pan of the uworlc force". Still, a lot of those people quite likely tuOTk as 
hard as "employed" people, and make enormous "contributions co the economy" -
"nonemployed" housewives, etc. My mother, busy from mom til night seven days a week 
throughout my youth, didn't "earn" a dime during the twenty,some years during which 
she raised five children. A 'labor force', in other words, can only grow per capita if we 
narrow the definition of what is co count as "work" in an irrelevant way. 
What is relevant to economic growth, then, is exclusivery that more of the services 
people wane are performed with the same ( .. sized) fundamental work force. And tluu 
means growth of technology, in the broad sense of "know,how", of humans coming to know 
ways of getting more output from the same input of time and effort. 
Of course it also means growth of capital. But growth of "capital" is the growth of 
means of production which can only coherently be said to "grow" if the resulting product 
per worker is greater; and that can be affected onl-y by technology (including good 
management practices). "Means of production" only are such means by virtue of the 
tedmolog:y embodied in them. A huge and potentially highly efficient plant for manufac­
turing airplanes, say, will lie idle if nobody knows what to do with it. 
When we think about it, then, we realize that there is nothing else that counts. 
Technology determines whether a given piece of capital equipment is a productive 
resource, just as it determines whether a given material substance is a resource ac aU. At 
the present time, the most imponant purely material resource there is, apart from food, 
water, and air, is probably sand! For that is the material component of the microchip. It 
also happens to be a substance that is unlimited in relation to possible demand- indeed, 
not customarily regarded as a "resource" at all. 
So easy is this to overlook that I think we need a name for the tendency to overlook 
it. I shall call it the "Materialist Fallacy" - the tendency to identib resources with scuff, 
matter. A good example is found in chat wonderfuE phrase of Robert Maynard Hutchins, 
former chancellor of the University of Chicago, who noted the ease with which you can 
get wealthy people to donate money for buildings on which their names can be inscribed, 
as compared with the difficulty of raising money from those same people to found the 
activities that are the sole point of the buildings in the first place. This he called the 
"Edifice complex". It's just one more instance of the Materialist Fallacy. The same is at 
work in the whole field of environment and resources. Once we look in the right 
direction, we wiJJl quickly see the fallaciousness of the Materialist Fallacy. The true 
resource, above all, is the human mind, employed in thinking up better ways to use the 
world around us. Without it we are nowhere. On the other hand, without much in the 13
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way of gross material stuff, we can nevertheless do very well indeed, given plenty of 
ingenuity. 
Technology Unlimited 
One nice thing about technology is that it is intrinsically exaemely easy, in �'material" 
rerms, to transfer and replicate. Jones thinks up a good idea, writes it up, and anyone who 
can read will soon have that same idea, with no further effort on Jones 1 part and what has 
now become a trivial use of merely "material resources". It was not always so: !in ancient 
Sumeria, inscribing rudimentary messages was a good day's work. (Even now, you will 
find philosophical periodicals asking their readers 'to buy copies of articles at 20¢/page 
and enormous waiting periods, when you could photocopy them immediately for 2¢ ... ) 
Even if our engineer's or scientist's idea is not shared very widely, yet if they and a few 
others can translate that good idea into concrete cerms, multitudes of consumers can 
soon be benefiting from it, despite their total ignorance of the underlying technology. 
Others will then get into the ace, finding ways to improve things still more, making the 
resultant products cheaper so that still more multitudes can get the benefiics. That is 
economic growth, and what enables it to happen is technology, including the technology 
of information transfer. 
Our ancestors in the stone age lived in the very same natural world thac we did, and 
the stock of strictly macerial substances from which they and we draw is presumably 
pretty much identical with what it was then. Yet the five billions of us are (comparatively) 
rich and the few thousands of them were (in the same sense) poor, indeed sub-destitute. 
The arnount of"labor" available per capita, remember, was the same then as now: the day 
is still but 24 hours long for each of us. 100% of the difference lies in know�how. le is the 
software of humankind that is its true capital, its true wealth. 
And with each new human added to the world's population, we have one more usable 
brain., with a concomitant capacity to add to the world's wealth. As Julian Simon points 
out, children, while they are children, are usually a net cost. In primitive countries, they 
are very soon a net benefit; we in the "developed" world must wait a little longer. But in 
the normal case, that individual will, in the course of his or her life, make a positive 
contribution to the world's wealth - noc a negative one. And of course some among 
those extra brains will make very great contributions - they will invent, say, the light 
bulb or the Macintosh computer, or compose Beethoven's symphonies. 
That is why resources are, in. the final analysis, not finite in any relevant senses. That 
is to say: a "finite" material stock, i.e. a bunch of substances that are in some way 
quantifiable and when so measured yield "finite" numbers in toto, suffices to enable 
people with their minds engaged to make themselves and, soon, all of us indefinitely better 
off in "material" (as well as any other) respects. What this means is that more for us does 
not mean less far them - or vice versa. So long as wealth grows by free means, that is, by 
a series of individually agreeable exchanges rather than by some extracting it from others 
by force, use of"material" resources is a positive sum activity. Then the producers and the 
users are better off, and those who do not use or produce it at that time are no worse off 
at that time, either; but in future, they too are better off, for they will be able to avail 
themselves of goods or services they could not otherwise choose. 
It has been insufficiently noticed that to deny the hypothesis of non-finite resources 
requires a heroic assumption: that we can predict future cechnology and, moreover, do it 
sufficiently well to know that, for certain resources, in principle nothing can ever be made 
that will substitute for them, or that no application of any new methods can ever improve 
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their supply. To make good on this, one would have to know alrea.d, what we do nor yet 
know - which of course one cannot. Or one would have to show good reason to think that 
mankind is running out of intellect or creauviry. Bue thae is wildly conrrary co the faces, 
on (again) any reasonable view. Indeed, the sheer fact of population increase makes the 
revene enormously more likely: creative technological thought will increase rather than 
decrease. 
It should be pointed out, too, that the direction of technology is inherently upward. 
This is because once something is known. it surys mown, barring genocide and 
widespread incineration. We always build on the past. What is newly discovered, then, 
is added to che "sum of human knowledge". 
Population Morals 
This aspect of the argument ends here. Every specific argumenc for population 
restriction on the basis of scarcity depends on a premise to the effect that some panicular 
resource is both necessary and irremediabty scarce. All such arguments are unsound. Either 
the resource in question is not relevantly finite or it is not literally necessary-something 
else can be used for the same purpose. If we run out of iron, cars and girders will be made 
of plastics, which are made out of sand, which is not relevantly scarce. And so on. 
A general point must be made about these matters. In all fields of production, 
everywhere, the familiar story is one of decreasing costs with increasing scale .. A firm thac 
produces virtually anything will find itself getting more and more efficient as time goes 
by, even without revolutionary improvements in its technology. This is due to what has 
come to be called "the learning curve": the people who do the work simply find ways to 
do it better, quicker, or with less effort. le is a universally observed phenomenon13; and 
it is entirely comprehensible in common-sense tenns. Even academics get better at what 
they do over the years, despite the initial implausibility of supposing thac one can find out 
better how to have abstract ideas. When we get to the toolroom and the assembly line, 
the scope for improvements in efficiency is essentially unlimited. 
I c is a consequence of these facts - (a) that goods cannot be simply identified with 
quantities of material objects (especially not with quantities of"resources") and (2) that 
technology is both potent and open-ended - that the very idea that costs of resources will 
increase as population increases is fundamentally wrongheaded. More people means 
more brains; mor•e brains means more and better ideas; more and better ideas means more 
and better desir�d goods and services forthcoming from the same "finite" stock of 
material stuff. As population increases, then, so will resources of all the requisite kinds. 
A working doomsday scenario requires the assumption that we are stuck in the same 
technological rut we happen to be in during the period over which the prophet in 
question gathers his data for the projected shortage. In any but the most shorc .. term 
context, this procedure is certain to give the wrong results, for the data in question are 
becoming obsolete with each passing day. 
2. "The Environment" 
What I have been saying is directly relevant to the general subject vaguely referred 
to by the currently modish term "The Environment". Natural resources are, of course, 
part of our environment. But we now need to tum to two other general issues. First, there 
are extensive questions these days about environmental deterioration. Those questions 
raise the underlying issue of just what counts as 'deterioration' for something so 15
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ubiqu1rous. There are rwo sorts of answers to consider. The firs!( concerns che potennal 
of our environment for making our lives worse, e.g. b · making them less healthy or 
shorter. But the second concerns the scarus of alleged environmencal constderanons 
themselves. ls there a separate set of values co be attached to the envuonmenc as such? 
Does ic, in fact, make any sense co say that x or y hmms "the environment''? I shall address 
boch of these, in very general terms, in the next part of this inquiry. 
Three Concerns 
Alleged deteriorations of our environmenc may be divided inco chree sons: 
First, and primarily, there are pollutions that are so called because they negatively 
affect human healch. 
Second, there are the "deep ecology" cheoris{S, who seem to think char animals, 
planes, canyons, indeed the "earth" itself is actually jusc like us - more moral agenrs who 
have rights on their own accounc. 
Third, there are aesthetic concerns: things that are thought, by th�e who consider 
them co be blemishes, co make che world around us visually, or perhaps sonically or 
olfactorily, less attractive. 
[ shall consider them in reverse order. 
Beauty 
Clearly health is a pervasive and reasonable concern of all of us, and the questions to 
be asked in that regard are baskally about whether the measures that people propose and 
enact really do promote the goal they are allegedly aimed at, and promote it in a rational 
way. That will be the main burden of my next remarks. Bue beauty is another matter. 
This second kind of concern raises very difficult problems of how to resolve 
disagreements. We all have our tastes, our special aesthetic values. Some can express 
these better than others, co be sure. But why should the aesthetic views of the articulate 
outweigh those of the people whose aesthetic values would be steamrollered by his 
proposals? Those who love uninhabited wildernesses, for instance, can have them if the 
rest of us commit suicide - in an environmentally clean way, of course. But is this a good 
reason why we should do so? We must at least appreciate that as soon as aesthetic 
concerns are what are really being invoked, then we are into a very differenc ball game 
from claims about health and safety. Moreover, there is no escape, at the public level, 
from the time-honored maxim that "beauty is in the eye of the beholder". We can't 
expect agreement on matters of taste. Therefore, the public agenda simply can't specify 
what is beautiful and what isn't, or which beauties shall be respected and which not. 
Still, there is a good way to handle this. We can invoke a rule that each person may 
incorporate his own selection of beauties on his own property; when he deals with others, 
he must either convince them of the rectitude of his own tastes, or else he must negotiate 
with them, perhaps buying the other person's property, at a mutually agreed price, so that 
he can redecorate it on his own terms. The same can be true of nature. If you and I chink 
chat such-and-such a bit of nature should be "preserved", or alt1ered, fine: buy it, and go 
to it! Admittedly, few will like this suggestion -because it is the only fair and rational one, 16
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the only one that can work with arrybcxl1's tastes. We'd all like to dictate the public casce. 
But we can't, if we are serious about us all being in this together, on equal terms. There 
should be no aesthetic dictators, any more than there should be any other hnd. 
Among the ideas that are proposed in this connection is the curious one that nature 
as such is beautiful. Those who have this idea presumably muse th.ink that any landscape 
is as gocxi as any other, all animals and plants equally beautiful, and so on. Pools of 
noxious liquids, homed toads, you name it - all are equally worthy of our delighted 
contemplation. If that doesn't strike you as pretty absurd to stan with, consider a further 
point: that everything. after all, is "natural": eveirything is pan of che natural world, 
governed by cause and effect. Oil spills, garbage dumps, and so on: all of these are natural 
in the most general sense. If nature-lovers don't wane co count that, they need co explain 
where and why to draw the line. If a Rembrandt painting is not to be counted "natural", 
O.K.: but then, do you rellll, want co say that nature is beuer? Do nightingales beat out 
Beethoven's Quance in C# Minor? Not in my book! 
Environmental Depth 
The second kind of claim has it that the environment has, so to speak, rights of its own 
- that "the environment" is intrinsicalfy valuable. Dealing fully with this view would take 
a fair amount of separate discussion, for it raises fundamental issues about the very 
meaning of moral notioru. I shall therefore say only a little about it. 
Morals are rules and principles for appraising our actioru in relation to each other. 
They are rules for groups, directing each individual in that group how to act, and in 
particular, how to act in society, that is, in relation to one's fellows. The only reasonable 
view of morality in a contemporary mixed society such as ours is the view that the rules 
of morals must be in the interests of each any every member of that society. His or her 
life is to be better, by virtue of following those rules, so long as everyone else does too, 
than it can reasonably be expected to be given any other set of such rules. 
But morals thus represent a sort of "agreement". This agreement is among people. 
Anything other than people comes into the discussion only under the aegis of being an 
object of somebo&y's interests, of some kind or other. Some of us like Nature one way, 
some another. Some like seals to be alive, some lilce to wear sealfur coats. We have to deal 
with each other in the face of such varying interests. But the depressingly popular (with 
philosophers) view that Nature itself is a sort of moral agent in "her" own right is, I am 
bound to say, one of the m�t deeply incoherent views in the whole philosophical world, 
not easily matched by any of the legendary metaphysicians. It is also, not coincidentally, 
a gold mine for "rent-seekers" - people interested in power�Uips, in bilking an uncom­
prehending and thus gullible public into performing what from their point of view are 
objectively useless activities. Nature is not a person, nor is it any sort of"organism"i and 
in any case, no organisms apart from ones with minds that we can communicate with are 
in on the Moral agreement. 
Of course it also, and nece.ssarily, shares all the problems of the first category discussed 
- of which it might charitably be regarded as a species, for that matter. For as soon as it 
is admitted that one is not claiming that cutting the trees, or whatever, will actually 
damage some human' s health or happiness, and yet it is insisted that we should desist for 
the sake of the trees themselves, one is tteating trees and other nonhuman entities as though 
they too were moral beings, with interests, desires) values of their own, to be taken into 
account in their own right. It is that aspect of "deep ecology" that is strictly iincoherent. 
For there is no such thing as "the interest of the environment", taken as a moral being in itself, 17
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apart from human interests. To say any such thing is on all fours with saying that we 
should all accept JX>licy X on the ground that that's what the Great God Vishnu wants. 
Those of us who don't accept that there is any such personage will not give any weight 
co such a demand, and rightly so. We can and ought to do exactly the same with those 
who advance the supposed incerescs of canyons, rocks, and forests in their own right. (ln 
fact, it is not ac all unfair co describe such views as a sore of pantheistic religion.) 
There is also no such thing as the "interest" of a canyon or even a flower, for that 
matter. The canyons chat we might wane co preserve do not care what happens co them 
any more than the dismal swamps we might want to drain, or the trees we might wane 
to rum into furniture. To think otherwise is co engage in mumbo jumbo anthropomor­
phism, something for which there is no room in the public debate about anything. 
Moreover, there is a single unerly fair and just way of treating people in relation to 
their special interests of this type: cell them they're welcome co buy some property and 
build their own preferred kind of church on it, or gee together with fellow believers and 
preserve weird endangered species, trees, whatever. No problem! But as to considering 
such claims for one moment as legicimace bases of public policy, forget it! Yet you will find 
muclh legislation nowadays devoted to protecting endangered species, swamps, you 
name it, quite irrespective of what such "protection"' does to the poor blokes who thought 
they owned the arieas in question. This is noc liberal government, it is government gone 
berserk, government sold out to bizarre special interests. 
Pollution 
In no area are we more bedevilled with the same general type of ill-conceived 
reasoning, harnessed to emotions and instinctive snap judgments, as in the general area 
of pollution. It is too large a one to go into great detail here, but the thoughtful reader 
will already have begun, I am sure, to anticipate the point. 
Health and Us 
That leaves health. And here too there is a definite message: namely, that the 
paramount need is to appreciate that health, for any remotely normal person, is one good 
among others. It is nor a privileged kind of good that takes total priority ooer all others. In 
virtually all of the things we do, we take risks to our health and life: when we drive to the 
grocery store, when we eat too much dessert, and so on and so on. To take such risks is, 
in general, perfectly rational. Obviously, if risks are too great, we would reasonably 
change our activities to reduce them if we can. If the probability of getting run over on 
my way to the store were 80% instead of .00000008%, then of course rd want to 
reconsider walking there. But it is, necessarily, aU a matter of degree. We are always 
weighing benefits and costs, where the "costs" are in the form of risks engendered by or 
in the course of the activities we consider engaging in. Always the question is: Do I gain 
enough from what I propose to do to make it worth taking whatever risks it entails? How 
great a risk I am willing to bear depends on how great the gain is, to myself or to those 
I care about. Most of us will risk our lives to save the lives of spouses or children. Most 
of us will take virtually no extra risk to save the life of a squirrel or a rodent - or a tree. 
Those who impose heavy costs on us on the ground that they are necessary in order 
to effect a scarcely measurable decrease in the likehhood that we or somebody will get 
cancer, or whatever else your current favorite disease is, are asking us to behave 
irrationally. And the result is that we are worse off, not better. People in Los Angeles, with 18
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all ofits smog and even wich its panoply of social problems, enjoy much bener health now 
than did the bands of natives who occupied the area five cenruries earlier. despite the 
complete absence of smog {outside - for they burned wocxi fires in their wigwams, likely 
at considerable reduction in life expectancy ) . 
Canada currendy spends well over cwo thousand dollars per individual per year on 
health care. Th.is is a Level of expenditure that probably makes no sense from the point 
of view of most of the people who "benefit" from it. Spending a loc less on medical 
attention and a lot more on other things that matter a lot more to chem would, in most 
cases, m.a1ce sense. And when it would, only bad arguments alx>ut resources stand in their 
way, "justifying" governments in forcing those people to shift their personal resources in 
the medical direction rather than elsewhere. Health is no more a fi.xed1 finite, global 
resource than anything else. And any policies on pollution, and on a "green" environ­
ment, based on such assumptions can only work ill - work to make us worse off on the 
whole. 
Tmy Effects, linearity, and Paracelsis' Principle 
Many centuries ago the famous doctor Paracelsis observed, in response to a question 
about which things are poisons, that everything is, if you take enough of it in che right 
circumstances; and also that nothing is, given small enough quantities and, again, the 
right circumstances. He had the right answer. But almost all modem regulations depend 
on violating Paracelsis' dictum. All it takes for an enterprising politician to gee on a 
bandwagon for prohibiting free market access to item X is a "finding" by "scientists" to 
the effect that X is "poisonous", as shown by the fact that if you force,feed some p<X>r 
unsuspecting rat with an incredibly large amount of the stuff, that rat will gee very sick, 
prolbablywithcancer. For the politician's purposes, the news that substance Y is a "known 
carcinogen" is great news; and to establish this, all he needs is the information that it can 
cause cancer. The next move is to trot out the latest fancy scientific measuring devices 
and discover that there is a bit of stuffY in, say, the water supply, or your favorite brand 
of ice cream, or whatever. In no time at all, Y will be tierboten. In Canada you can't buy 
saccharine over the counter, and manufacturers aren't pennitted to install it in your 
favorite drinks. And why? Because somebody discovered that if you forcefeed rats with 
more of the stuff than any human could conceivably consume no matter how much they 
want to, then the rat's grandchildren show a higher likelihood of getting cancer. Neat! 
Two general assumptions are needed co justify this kind of regulation, and. one specific 
one. The general ones are (1) Linearity: if X is bad for you, then an-y amount, no matter 
how tiny, is also bad for you; and (2) that the goal of promoting health is sufficient to 
justify imposing an-y amount of inconvenience and expense on the public. The special 
assumption needed is (J) that rats are good models for people, and that it is reasonable 
to infer from the bad effects of huge quantities inflicted on rats that normal, voluntary 
exposures by humans will also result in bad effects. 
The interesting thing about these assumptions is that all of them are known to be false. 
Linearity down to vanishing input levels is practically unlcnown in the biological portions 
of nature, which just aren't that simple; and there is ample new evidence of its falsity 
regarding various specific substances or processes. No rational person values his health 
to the absolute subordination of all else. And rats aren•t good models for people; 
moreover, forced consumption isn't a good model of normal consumption. (Force­
feeding of anything, such as water, will hasten the onset of cancer, for instance. Paracelsis 
strikes again!) 19
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To provide a few interesting details. Modem equipment enables us to detect 
vanishingly small quantities of, for instance, asbestos, another of th0$e fumous "known 
carcinogens". Assumptions (1) and (2) combined have thus far cost the North American 
public billions of dollars to pay for the removal of asbestos from buildings, despite the 
facts. well known to engineers, that (l) the danger of removing the asbestos co the 
workmen who remove it, and to occupants of those buildings for considerable periods 
thereafter, is hundreds of times greater than the danger of leaving the stuff where ic is, 
forever; and (2) the amount of asbestos floating around in perfectly ordinary air is 
cypically greater than the amount found in the vicinity of asbestos�insulated ceilings and 
walls. While this is a flagrant example, like the Canadian saccharine one, it is not, alas, 
unique. Indeed, it is really typical. Any recent newspaper entry about a new environmen· 
cal action is likely to be at the same level - chlorine in the Great Lakes, radiation from 
nuclear reactors, ethanol in those delicious odors that emanate from bread bakeries1� -
you name it! 
Here's another interesting one. Physicist Bernard Cohen of the University of 
Pinsburgh did an in-depth study to determine the correlation of cancer incidence with 
the incidence of radioactive radon gases in homes15• Gathering data from some 1 .700 
counties across the country, with data from hundreds of thousands of dwellings, he soon 
discovered a curious fact: that incidence of cancer, instead of being directly proportional 
to that of radon, as the linearity hypothesis would imply, was inve-rsely proportional to it 
over the range of basically low levels being investigated. Of course high-level radiation 
exposure, as experienced by fire-fighters at Chernobyl, rapidly produces fatal cases of 
leukemia and stuff; but we are here considering low-level exposures, and the facts seem 
to be chat higher levels within that range are healthier than lower ones. 
Assumption No. 2 has already been discussed in a general way. But it is useful to add 
a further dimension to it. It turns out that what's wrong with it isn't just chat we 
reasonably weigh bealth against other values without assigning it absolute priority. For 
it is also true that wealth translates into health. The wealthier are in general healthier, and 
this too can be quantified. We can say pretty definitely that if we reduce income, we 
reduce life expectancy. And so if we tax away a whole lot of money from some people in 
order to try to "save" the lives of others, then at some point, the transfer becomes 
medically uneconomic: the cost in life-expectancy of the transfer outweighs the proposed 
saving. When does this happen? Precise figures would be hard to give and of course vary, 
but it seems to be in the range of a half to one million dollars per saved life. Programs that 
spend fifty million dollars to save ten lives are not just wasting a lot of money - they are 
also, quite possibly. costing a net of forty lives lost. Even those who chink that health must 
have priority over all else will have to be impressed by this, if (as seems very likely) the 
premises are right. 
I hasten to add that the last assumption is not necessary to show that environmental 
interventions against vanishingly tiny risks is unjustified. All we need is that the amount 
of supposed protection you are getting is an amount you wouldn't be willing to spend the 
amount of money that's being exacted from you to get it. That the protection is often less 
than none at all, is actually counterproductive, is !important, but is really conceptual 
overkill. 
Assorted Catastrophes (Latest Trends in) 
If science delivers a scrap to a politician, we may be sure that it will tum into a veritable 
feast by sundown. This is the more so when the scientist in question is being a little less 20
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than purely scientific in his or her deliverances. One of the wonder stories of modem 
times i.s that of Global Warming, fear of which is generating expenditures in the billions, 
with trillions wainng in the wings tf the doomsayers play their cards nghc. The Global 
Warming scenario seems co have got its main start from two sources. One was a farruliar 
phenomenon to climatologists lmown as the "Greenhouse Effect". The "effect" m 
question occurs when heat is trapped near the eanh by assorted gases, instead of escaping 
to outer space. Not too many lay people are aware that the Greenhouse Effect is noc new; 
not only has it been known to scientists for a century and more, but the Effect itself is also 
what males life on earth possible. Absent all greenhouse effects, planet earth would be 
as pleasant an environment for life as, say, the moon. 
Meanwhile, it is a fact that "greenhouse gases" have been increasing in our century. 
This is supposed to cause an increase in the earth's temperature, and many and dire are 
the predictions about what will happen if the increase in question gets our of hand: 
melting of the polar ice caps, with consequent raising of ocean levels, thus inundating 
New York and London as well as places we can dlo without. .. ; droughts, desertification, 
the works! You can have a field day with these effects, if you like that sort of thing. 
There's just one trouble. Although the scientific basis for the hypothesis that an 
increase in greenhouse gases will, other things being equal, result in increased tempera, 
cures is absolutely solid, there is the embarrassing detail that the earth's temperature has 
nor risen significantly. Worse yet, the greenhouse effect, if it happens anywhere, is 
supposed to happen nearer to where all those gases are emitted, namely in the 
industrialized Northern Hemisphere, which is also where most of the landmass is. But -
wuddya know? -the only significant increase in temperature (and it's very small) has 
been in the Southern Hemisphere, which has no excuse for behaving Like that. The 
Northern Hemisphere, on the other hand, has enjoyed no net warming in the last 55 
years. {It did get a little in the earlier part of this century -before greenhouse gases were 
emitted at anything like their current rate.) 
Economizing 
Let me conclude by emphasizing a note on which I began. Each particular person on 
this world operates in an environment of scarcities. There are lots of things we would like 
more of, but our limited budget, of time, energy, money, or of specific other resources, 
requires us to choose among them. Economy is optimization: trading some resources for 
others that we suppose have higher value for us. 
'But from the fact that each person rationally operates in this manner, it does not follow 
that there are global scarcities, "shortages" in the world as a whole, such that collective 
policies are required to deal with them, even though these policies impose uneconomic 
cos.ts on the individuals concerned. Thus we are required to use paper cups instead of 
styrofoam, despite the fact that the former costs several times as much, is in every respect 
worse from the disposal and energy .. consumption points of view, and is much less 
convenient - cold coffee, burned fingers, and so on. And all this, why? Because of a 
highly speculative (and now refuted 16) hypothesis about the influence of styrofoam on the 
ozone layer and its alleged implications for our ultimate health. That the risks involved 
even if the hypothesis were correct would, when related to any particular individual, 
show the cure to be much worse than the disease does not deter environmentally rabid 
governments from imposing those costs on us gullible citizens. But that is the story of 
virtually all of the currently contemplated legislation, and its reasoning is the same. Clean 
air, health, etc. are held to be resources superior to others even if you or I would, given 
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our choice over the actual values involved, prefer the others. And they are held to be 
intrinsic goods, necessary, and globally scarce. 
The moral is: don't you believe it. By all means, let us have more technical 
investigation into pollution, water purity, and so on. But let's integrate all this imponant 
information into rational decisions, rather than having it operate as tht: minor premise 
in an argument whose major premises have to do with globally finite resources and the 
like. What we have today is a classic case of misuse of science by government. It has 
already cost us considerable, and it will continue to do so. I have shown that a major part 
of the reasoning behind most environmental policy forays is hopelessly unsound. And the 
policy implications from their erroneous premises are certainly going to make life worse 
for you and me. 
An Environmental Book List [non-PC version] 
Dixie Lee Ray, Trashing the Planet (Washington: Regnery Gateway, 1990) A scientist, 
sometime governor of the State of Washington, voted Woman of the Year in 197 J by the 
Ladies Home Journal, many other distinctions. Professor Ray produces the basic 
scientific results on all of the major environmencal issues: global wanning, ozone, pcbs, 
nuclear power, and the rest - all of which are almost completely at variance with the 
curtent PC Environmentalist trends. This is the one to read if you read only one. 
Terry L. Anderson and Donald R. Leal, Free Market Environmerualism (Boulder, Col: 
Westview Press, 1991) -A number of essays on a wide range of environmental issues, 
showing how (or, if you prefer, arguing that) secure and marketable property rights 
provide the right solutions to the problems. A groundbreaking work. 
Ronald Bailey, Eco-Scam (NY: St. Martin's, 1993). Fertile source of quotations from the 
various ecological prophets of our time; and of the evidence against their apocolyptic 
predictions. 
Robert C. Balling. Jr., The Heated Debate (San Francisco: Pacific Research Institute, 
1992). He too provides extensive hard data on climate, and offers a plausible hypothesis 
why the "greenhouse effect" is not in fact producing general warming; also that the 
combination of forces at work, including Man's contribution, is likely to be on the whole 
beneficial rather than detrimental to people. Excellent for its explanations of the various 
theories and findings. (See also Michaels, below) 
C. Roy Bennett, Risks in Environmentalism: Comments on the Canadian Green Plan (U. 
of Waterloo: Institute for Risk Research, 1992). A devastating analysis of Canadian 
"Green Plan" programs, demonstrating that "most environmental regulatory proposals 
are based upon inadequate scientific knowledge. In many cases, they are firmly founded 
upon the wrong scientific assumptions, particularly where public health is concerned." 
N. C. Lind, J. S. Nathwani, and E. Siddal, Managing Risks in the Public Interest (U. of 
Waterloo: lnstiturte for Risk Research, 1992). A basic proposal on how to handle 
problems of risk to health and life. Especially significant is the point that costs in dollars 
translate into life expectancy, so that spending megabucks on tiny supposed decrements 
of risk actually costs more lives than it saves. 
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Patnck J. Mtchaels, Sound and Fury: The Sctence and Polmcs of Global Warming 
(W ashmgton: CA TO Institute, 1992). A dunatologist details how che current 
brouhaha regarding "global wanning" is in total conflict Wlth the facts. Provtdes 
extensive hard data on chm.ate, and offers a plausible hypothes:is why the "greenhouse 
effect" is not in fact producing general warming; also th.ac the combination of forces at 
work including Man's contribution, is likely co be on the whole benefic ial rather than 
detrimental to people. 
Julian Simon, Population Maaers {Rutgers, NJ: Transaction, 1991) .  Professor Simon 
points out char the alleged population crisis simply isn't happening, and shows why 
the re is no reason to suppose that "resources" necessary for the flourishing of humamry 
are going to run out, now or ever. 
Julian Simon, The Ul.timau Resource (Princeton, 1981 ) .  This book provides the 
generalized theoretical argument th.at is buttressed by the more extensively empirical 
work in Populacion Matters. People are the real resource, and it is because they are that 
natural resources are not going co be a "problem" as so widely thought, and why there 
is no reason to suppose that "resources" necessary for the flourishing of humanity are 
going co run out, now or ever. 
Aaron Wildavsky,SearchingforSafecy (Rucgers, NJ: Transaction, 1988). Wildavsky's 
boolc. is a real primer on the fallacy of trying to focus exclusively on the "worst case". 
He demonstrates how doing so will make the very things one is worried about worse 
instead of better. 
Notes 
I don't thinlc ic would be, in face, and argue chis in .. Property Rights: 
Original Acquisition and Loc1'ean Provisos" • currently unpublished but 
available from che author. 
In the sixties and seventies, especially, other prophets were busy forecasting 
mass starvation, and it became popular for everyone, including philosophers, 
to thinlc of the earch as a sort of "lifeboat". Ar che same time char all chis 
forecasting was being publicized at a remarkable rate, the facts were busy 
proving them wrong, as they had been doing iin the previous century or so that 
had ela�d since the publication of Thomas Malthus' Essay on Population. 
Th.is paper was prepared originally for che meetings of the Ontario 
Philosophical Sociecy in Ottawa, Canada, October, 1991. It has since benefited 
from discussions at several Universities, with community groups, and with 
individuals. 
4 The main ones are: "Utilitarianism and New Generations" Mind 1967 
Reprinted: M. Bayles, Ethics and Population (Cambridge: Schenkman, 1976); 
"Moral !Problems of Population", The Moni.5t. Winter 1973; "Future People 
and Us", R I. Sikora and Brian Barry, eds., Obligations to Future Generations 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978). 
As of 1995, this figure can be multipled by at least ten. The agricultural 
technology assumed in the text actually dates from 1969. and things have 
changed since then. With developments in hvdrooonic fannine. there is no 
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realistic upper limit to the number of persons whose lives can be sustained on 
a given unit ofland. le is thought to be, not 27 square meters. but more like 
2 square meters. 
'6 Anne H .  Erhlich, "People and Food", Population and Environment, vol. 
12, No. 3 · Spring 1991,  pp. 223-224. 
Julian Simon. Population Maaers (New Brunswick, NJ.: Transacrion 
Press, 1990), pp. 1 1 5-1 17. 
8 Advances in the art of house insulation, however, can reduce our 
requirements of energy for this purpose virtually to zero. Super- insulated 
houses -which are by no means uneconomic to build, costing only perhaps 
20% more than conventional ones of similar size -already require no energy 
to heat beyond that supplied by the people in them, plus their usual burning 
of lightbulbs. 
9 Most primitive people, in fact, squander energy and generate massive 
pollutions while they are at it. Those following this course have co accompany 
their recommendations with proposals to severely reduce population on top 
of it. not realizing that this is due precisely co the inefficiency of the proposed 
alternatives. 
10 'UR' = Julian Simon, The Ultimate Resource (Princeton, 1981) 
11  Julian Simon, Population Matters (New Brunswick., N.J.: Transaction 
Press, 1990), p. 82. 
12 Simon, op. cit. Ch. 2, pp. 63-158, presents a wealth of information on 
these matters. 
1 3  See George Gilder, The Spirit of Enterprise (NY: Simon & Schuster, 
1984), for many examples. 
14 WaU Street Journal, April 13, 1994 · front page. 
15 Bernard Cohen's lecture was presented at the conference on Managing 
Risks co Life and Health, sponsored by the Royal Society of Canada, the 
Canadian Academy of Engineering, and Health Canada, at Ottawa, Oct. 18, 
1993. Publication pending. 
16 See Robert Bidinotto, The Green Machine. Mr. Bidinotto is a staff writer 
for Readers Digest but this material does not (as yet) appear in that journal. 
It is currently available from the author at 422 Park Avenue, New Castle, PA 
16101, for $4.50, postage included. 
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